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ABSTRACT: In this paper it is argued that philosophical anthropology is central to ethics and 
politics. The denial of this has facilitated the triumph of debased notions of humans developed 
by Hobbes which has facilitated the enslavement of people to the logic of the global market, a 
logic which is now destroying the ecological conditions for civilization and most life on Earth. 
Reviving the classical understanding of the central place of philosophical anthropology to ethics 
and politics, the early work of Hegel and Marx is explicated, defended and further developed by 
interpreting this through developments in post-mechanistic science. Overcoming the opposition 
between the sciences and the humanities, it is suggested that the conception of humans 
developed in this way can orient people in their struggle for the liberty to avert a global 
ecological catastrophe. 
KEYWORDS: Philosophical anthropology; ethics; political philosophy; Aristotle; Hobbes; Herder; 
Hegel; Schelling;  Marx; hierarchy theory; C.S. Peirce; biosemiotics; human ecology; culture. 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all the destructive ideas produced and disseminated by the British philosopher G.E. 
Moore, one of the most influential progenitors of analytic philosophy, none has been 
more pernicious or disastrous for culture and civilization than the notion of the 
“naturalistic fallacy”.1 While based on an argument about how terms are defined, 
specifically the term “good”, this so-called fallacy denied any relevance to efforts to 
advance our understanding of the cosmos and our place within it to ethics and political 
philosophy. The result has been not only the trivializing of ethics, political philosophy 
and philosophy more generally, but the trivialization of science which, partly as a 
consequence of this, has been redefined as nothing but a means to develop technology. 
The resulting fragmentation of intellectual inquiry has impacted on universities which 
are being transformed from public institutions into transnational business enterprises. 
But this is merely an aspect of a much broader transformation of institutions as local, 
1 See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica,[1903] rev. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.58ff. 
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national and international communities, their cultures now in fragments, are being 
pulverized into atomic individual actors in the globalized economy. The predatory 
managers of transnational corporations, through their domination of political parties 
and governments, and more ominously, through their control of people’s minds 
through advertising, public relations and control of the mass media, now effectively rule 
the world. While the arguments on which the notion of the “naturalistic fallacy” are 
based: that it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is”, or that values cannot be 
derived from facts, or more fundamentally, that terms must either be accepted as 
primitive or defined in a way that shows them to be shorthand for combinations of 
more primitive terms, have all been demolished,2 we are still left with the legacy of this 
cultural fragmentation.  
It is necessary to clear the air, to reveal what are the really important arguments 
pertaining to ethics and politics and what they imply for how we should live. The 
historian of technology, Lynn White Jr., argued: “The artifacts of a society, including its 
political, social and economic patterns, are shaped primarily by what the mass of 
individuals in that society believe, at the sub-verbal level, about who they are, about 
their relation to other people and to the natural environment, and about their 
destiny.”3 It is these beliefs that must be made conscious and considered. The question 
of what are humans, what distinguishes them from other forms of life and what is the 
place of life in the cosmos are major questions for science not because such knowledge 
might be exploited commercially, but because these question are central to ethics and 
politics. It is only in relation to the question What are humans? that we can properly 
consider the question What are human possibilities? And it is only with an 
understanding of human possibilities that we can then properly ask the question: Which 
possibilities should be realized? That is, this question needs to be at the core of science 
to enable people to work out what should we aim at, what kinds of beings should we 
strive to become. It is only when we have at least some kind of answer to the question 
What are humans? that we can think clearly about how we should act, how we should 
live and how we should organize society.  
This relationship between anthropology, ethics and politics was taken as obvious 
and central in the arguments of Plato’s Republic, but was stated more clearly by 
Aristotle. The arguments in his Nicomachean Ethics on what is the ultimate good that we 
should aim at as individuals and in politics presuppose a notion of what humans are. 
Aristotle argued that the good of humans is activity in conformity with virtue, and if 
there are several virtues, with the best and most complete.4 Aristotle argued that 
humans have an element in common with plants and animals, that is, vegetative 
2 It should be obvious that if someone is a ship’s captain, they ought to put their passengers’ safety before 
their own, that if we know that they did in fact do so then we can infer that they are good ship’s captains, and 
that the notions of ‘captain’ and ‘passenger’ cannot be defined through primitive terms. See Julius Kovesi, 
Moral Notions, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. Kovesi’s argument has been further developed 
in Arran Gare, Nihilism Inc., Sydney: Ecological Press, 1996, p.377ff.  
3 Lynn White Jr. ‘Continuing the Conversation’, in Western Man and Environmental Ethics, ed. Ian G. 
Barbour, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973, p.57.  
4 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a 16-18., trans. Martin Ostwald, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962, 
p.17. 
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activity. This is the irrational element in humans. As with animals, humans also have 
appetites and a limited rationality associated with working out how to go about 
satisfying these. However, humans are also capable of a higher rationality of 
participating in the governance of their communities and of enquiry to comprehend the 
world and their place within it. It is these that are deemed distinctively human, and it is 
in these activities that we develop the best and most complete virtues. That is, it is only 
though identifying the distinctive qualities of humans, conceived as a particular form of 
life, that the ultimate ends of humans are defined and analyzed. The Nicomachean Ethics 
investigates what is the best kind of life for individuals, and the Politics examines the 
ways in which societies can be organized to reveal their potential for enabling people to 
live the best possible lives. Significantly, Aristotle characterized humans as “political 
animals”, that is, beings who live in self-governing communities, implying that people 
who do not live in such communities cannot realize their highest potential and 
therefore cannot become fully human. 
All subsequent Western philosophy of ethics and politics has assumed overtly or 
covertly this framework as its point of departure. This does not mean that philosophers 
have defended this framework or even acknowledged it, but in opposing it or refusing 
to acknowledge it, they remained under its influence. Stoics and Epicureans in Ancient 
Hellenistic and Roman civilizations differed in their characterizations of the cosmos 
and of life, and therefore in their characterization of what is the good life and how to 
lead it, but still assumed Aristotle’s framework for working out what is the good life. 
Neo-Platonists absorbed many of Aristotle’s arguments, and when Christian thinkers 
synthesized Neo-Platonism and Christianity, they did so not by totally rejecting 
Aristotle but by reformulating and augmenting his ideas. While St Augustine focused 
mostly on individual lives and dealt with politics as only of peripheral concern, Thomas 
Aquinas built his ethics and politics on the foundations provided by Aristotle. While the 
Renaissance thinkers of Northern Italy were more interested in Roman than Greek 
philosophy, were less interested in what distinguished humans from other life forms and 
focused more on politics, their work would not have been possible without the 
framework of thinking provided by Aristotle. They accepted Aristotle’s view that the 
potential of humanity could only be realized in self-governing communities, assuming a 
view of humans that implied that liberty is the goal of political life. On this assumption 
they developed a new form of education encompassing everything pertaining to 
humans, that is the “humanities”. An education in the humanities sought to cultivate 
self-knowledge through which students would be able govern their passions and shape 
them into virtues, thereby becoming fully human.5 The ideas associated with this 
education came to be known as humanism, or, in the case of those concerned to 
promote liberty and educate people in the virtues required to sustain liberty, “civic 
humanism”.  
The foundation of civic humanism in Aristotelian philosophy was clearly 
understood by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes set out to destroy the 
5 See David A. Lines, ‘Humanistic and Scholastic Ethics’, The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, 
ed. James Hankins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.304-318, esp. p.304. 
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philosophical foundations on the basis of which liberty had been defended and extolled, 
and to do this, he had to destroy Aristotle’s conception of humans.6 In Leviathan, 
published in 1651, he embraced the mechanistic cosmology of Galileo as a replacement 
for Aristotelian cosmology and as an alternative to the rival radical Neo-Platonism of 
the Nature Enthusiasts such as Giordano Bruno, and began with a characterization of 
humans as complex machines moved by appetites and aversions.7 The first part of 
Leviathan, “Of Man”, characterizes humans as complex machines with astonishing 
detail and clarity. This is not only the source of the notion of rights based on contract, 
utilitarianism, ethical and psychological egoism and ethical subjectivism, but also the 
idea that thinking is nothing but adding and subtracting, that science is nothing but an 
instrument for controlling the world, and that arts and the humanities that study them 
are nothing but amusements. Conceiving humans in this way not only denied the 
possibility of humans gaining autonomy or liberty as the Greeks and Romans had 
described it, but rendered it all but unintelligible.8 Humans have appetites and 
aversions, they do not choose these or have to work out what they are, and reasoning 
can only be reasoning by individuals about how to control nature and people to avoid 
their aversions and satisfy their appetites, or to reach agreement on better 
arrangements to realize these ends. The higher element of humans, rationality 
characteristic of political and philosophical life where people debate how to realize the 
common good, or beyond that, engage in enquiry into nature and humanity, thereby 
comprehending  the place of humanity in the cosmos and defining the ultimate ends of 
humanity, was simply denied.  
Hobbes’ philosophy came to be identified with the scientific view of humans, 
carrying all the authority accorded to science through the success of Newton’s celestial 
mechanics. This view of humans has been simply assumed by most economic theory, 
embodied in the concept “economic man”, and in most mainstream psychology, the 
ultimate goal of which is to work out how to control people more efficiently. Political 
theorists who have attempted to make politics into a science are also for the most part 
distant disciples of Hobbes. Augmenting these doctrines is Social Darwinism portraying 
life as a struggle for survival between competing mechanisms, evaluating everything in 
terms of its instrumental value in this struggle for survival. Fashionable contemporary 
notions of “posthumanism” or “transhumanism” are only distant echoes of Hobbes’ 
philosophy and Darwinian evolutionary theory.9 This conception of humans has been 
most effective ethically and politically when it has been presupposed rather than 
explicitly defended, and the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” has played a central role in 
allowing it to be presupposed without being questioned. The questions of what are 
humans, what distinguishes them from other forms of life and what is their potential are 
6 See Quentin Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986. 
8 Hobbes made this clear in his earlier book, De Cive or The Citizen, ed. Stirling P. Lamprecht, New York, 
1949. 
9 On this, see Nick Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 
Vol.14(1), April, 2005. For a critique of posthumanism, see Michael Zimmerman, ‘The Singularity: A 
Crucial Phase in Divine Self-Actualization?’ Cosmos & History, 4(2), 2008:347-370. 
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not raised because Hobbes’ world-view is dogmatically presupposed, disguised by 
empiricist or positivist theories of knowledge which deny the role of theoretical 
assumptions in empirical inquiry. More importantly, the Hobbesian view of humans 
has been inculcated through institutions as a habitus, a disposition to interpret situations 
in all practical contexts in accordance with it, placing it even further beyond 
questioning.10 This occlusion is made complete by avoiding reading Hobbes’ work 
where the source of modern ideas would become immediately apparent in all their 
perinatal nakedness. With the inculcation of his conception of humans, people are 
rendered powerless to alter their destinies or influence the course of history and can be 
treated as objects to be controlled. They are reduced to cogs in a social order that is 
inexorably destroying the current regime of the global ecosystem on which civilization 
depends without any possibility of transforming this social order.  
THE TROUBLED BIRTH OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Despite the rigor with which Hobbes’ developed his conception of humans, his whole 
philosophy is radically incoherent. This became increasing evident as his epigone 
expounded his ideas. Philosophers such as Julien De La Metrie and Baron von Holbach 
continued to advance Hobbes’ effort to understand humans as complex machines, but 
this went with accepting Hobbes’ and John Locke’s theory of mind as the realm of 
sensations produced by the action of the external world on the body. Knowledge was 
seen to be the product of the interactions between sensations and their decaying 
products, the memories of these sensations. What became increasingly obvious was that 
if all knowledge is based on sensations in the mind which is spatially enclosed within the 
body, there could be no basis for knowing that there is an external world, let alone that 
it is a mechanical order of matter in motion. The philosophy of David Hume (1711-
1776), essentially a reductio ad absurdum of the mechanistic view of humans, denying 
humans even a mind, made this fully explicit. It was in reaction to this Hobbesian view 
of humans that philosophical anthropology emerged, extolling higher potentialities for 
humans than Hobbes, or Hume, could acknowledge. 
Inspired in part by Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
in his lectures, later published in 1797 as Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, began 
by claiming an absolutely central place for the study of humans. As he put it: 
The aim of every step in the cultural progress which is man’s education is to 
assign this knowledge and skill he has acquired to the world’s use. But the most 
important object is the world to which he can apply them is man, because man is 
his own final end – so an understanding of man in terms of his species, as an 
earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called knowledge of 
the world, even though man is only one of the creatures in the world.11 
To emphasise this, in his Handbook to his lectures on logic, Kant defined philosophy in 
its universal sense in terms of the questions it seeks to answer: “1. What can I know? 2. 
10 This has been analysed by Gare, Nihilism Inc., chap.5, 6 and 7. 
11 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary J. Gregor, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974, p.3. 
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What ought I to do? 3. What can I hope for? 4. What is Man?” The last question is 
answered by anthropology, and Kant proclaimed: “Fundamentally, all this could be 
reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last.”12 In 
characterizing humans, Kant emphasized above all that humans are self-conscious. 
Having the idea “I”, they are persons with a unity of consciousness through all change. 
This, Kant argued, is what makes them free and able to act as free agents. However, 
Kant was still very much dominated by the triumph of Newton’s celestial mechanics 
and the mechanistic world-view. To defend the notion of freedom, he accepted an 
almost complete dualism between subjects and the objective world of things, which for 
him included animals. A person, he argued, is “a being altogether different in rank and 
dignity from things, such as irrational animals, which we can dispose of as we please.”13 
Despite Kant’s effort to give a place to biology in the Critique of Judgement and to 
examine the biological premises of anthropology,14 this view had been entrenched by 
the Critique of Pure Reason which focussed on knowledge rather than accounting for the 
diverse kinds of beings there are.  
Despite Kant’s efforts, this led to the development of Idealism. Idealists typically 
circumscribe the cognitive claims of science, portraying it as only dealing with the 
realm of appearances, while according a superior status for philosophy as the discipline 
dealing with consciousness, whether individual or social. By focusing on consciousness, 
these philosophers explain the possibility of deterministic scientific knowledge, but also 
give a place to ethics based on the assumption that humans are free agents. However, 
this tendency has set up a radical and apparently irreconcilable opposition in Western 
culture between the sciences, on the one side, and the humanities on the other. 
Scientists continuously extended their research program and their claim to be able to 
comprehend the world in mechanistic terms, and claimed that only the methods of 
science can produce true knowledge. The humanities, supported by idealist 
philosophers, claimed a superior kind of knowledge upholding values transcending 
Hobbes’ appetites and aversions, or mere pleasure and pain, and represented science as 
only capable of gaining a limited, one-sided knowledge. This idealist tendency within 
the humanities, and the associated stand-off with science, stunted the development of 
philosophical anthropology and also inhibited efforts to raise the question of what are 
humans. Edmund Husserl, for instance, the founder of one of the most influential 
schools of thought in Western philosophy, “phenomenology”, after having developed 
phenomenology in a more idealist direction criticized members of his own school of 
thought (Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger and Helmuth Plessner) who had attempted to 
revive philosophical anthropology.15  
However, Kant’s critical turn had not been accepted by his most eminent student, 
Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), who took up the question What are humans? and 
12 Quoted by Martin Buber, ‘What is Man?’, Between Man and Man, New York: Macmillan, 1965, p.119. 
13 Kant, Anthropology, p.9. 
14 On this see Alix A. Cohen, ‘Kant on epigenesis, monogenesis and human nature: The biological 
premises of anthropology,’ Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol, & Biomed. Sci. 37 (2006): 675-693. 
15 Edmund Husserl, ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’ [1931] trans. Richard G. Schmitt, in Roderick M 
Chisholm, Realism and the Background to Phenomenology, New York: Free Press, 1960, chap.6. 
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made this central to his whole philosophy.16 Rejecting the mechanistic view of nature, 
he argued that nature consists of dynamic, purpose seeking, creative forces interacting 
with each other, and that humans are a distinctive life form within this dynamic nature. 
Noting the effect of the upright posture on humans, and arguing for a holistic view of 
language, Herder argued that humans are essentially social and cultural, involved in a 
struggle to identify their own and their communities’ unique centres of gravity and to 
realize their unique potentials. The end of life is not satisfying appetites but self-
realization. Herder took up and developed the concept of culture, using it in the plural 
and extending it to characterize the whole way of life of a people. At the same time, 
though, Herder argued that cultures have evolved through history as people have 
developed greater “humanity”.  
Herder’s dynamic view of nature was developed by Goethe and Schelling and led 
to the tradition of Naturphilosophie, which challenged the assumptions of mechanistic 
science and contributed to the development of post-mechanistic natural science. 
Herder’s reflections on human nature also influenced a number of philosophers. In 
particular Herder’s ideas were embraced by both Hegel (1770-1831) and Marx (1818-
1883) and through their influence have been central to ethical and political philosophies 
designed to combat the atomistic utilitarianism of the tradition of thought deriving 
from Hobbes. The notions of self-actualization and culture have had a major impact on 
history and the human sciences. The notion of culture has been central to the 
development of ethnology (or ‘anthropology’) studying primitive or traditional societies, 
to the development of sociology studying modern societies, and to the development of 
“humanistic” psychology which accords a central place to sociality, human creativity 
and self-actualization.17 Developed largely in opposition to mainstream economics and 
psychology, these “humanistic” human sciences have occupied a middle ground 
between science and the humanities.18  
 This influence was often obscured, however. The lecture notes or writings of Hegel 
and Marx which made the question of what are humans explicit were produced early 
in their careers and were not published, or at least not published as books, until the 
Twentieth Century. This led to distorted interpretations of their later work, firstly by 
Marx of Hegel, and then of Marx whose ideas were assimilated by some “orthodox” 
Marxists to the Hobbesian tradition of thought. A complicating factor was the 
development of Darwinian evolutionary theory and later Darwin’s own efforts to 
characterize humans, and the influence he had on subsequent thinkers. The notion of 
evolution developed by Darwin really derived from the work of the Naturphilosophen, but 
Darwin aspired to advance the tradition of Newtonian science.19 While Darwin himself 
was ambivalent about the ethical implications of his work, the mainstream of biological 
16 John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology: Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2002. 
17 On Herder and his influence, see Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 
Henry Hardy (ed.), London: Pimlico, 2000, pp.168-242. 
18 On this, see Wolf Lepenies, Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
19 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004, p.518.   
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science carried on this quest to reduce biology to chemistry and physics. They 
eventually concluded that humans are nothing more than the most efficient 
mechanisms produced by strings of DNA as instruments for their survival and 
reproduction, having developed this efficiency through past struggles for survival 
between such machines which had eliminated inefficient machines.20 Sociobiologists, 
and cognitive scientists interpreting human cognition through the metaphor of artificial 
intelligence, have continued in their efforts to develop this Hobbesian view of humans. 
However, other biologists were inspired by Darwin to not only see humans as part of 
nature, but to see them as beings with very distinctive and irreducible characteristics 
that had somehow evolved from and emerged within nature and which should be 
explained as such.  
When efforts to grapple with the question of what are humans were revived later in 
the Twentieth Century they were almost overwhelmed by the confusion of discourse. 
Combating various developments of Hobbesian thought, efforts have been made to 
better characterize humans by Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, 
Ernst Cassirer, George Herbert Mead, Ernst Bloch, Arnold Gehlen, Hans Jonas, 
Martin Buber, Erwin Straus, Stephen Strasser, Mikhail Bakhtin, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Gregory Bateson, Jean Piaget, Konrad Lorenz, Rom Harré, Axel Honneth, 
Hans Joas and Alasdair MacIntyre, among others. Despite their insights, however, 
none of these thinkers has been able to establish philosophical anthropology as a 
developing tradition of inquiry. Underlying the confused state of such inquiry has been 
the conflict between mainstream science and the humanities that has stunted the 
development of the humanities. There has also been the fragmentation of philosophy 
into irreconcilable rival traditions of thought while new insights into the nature of 
humanity were being provided by historical and ethnological work on the diversity of 
human cultures and social formations. Then with the discovery of the early works of 
Hegel and Marx it became evident that their ideas were more profound than both the 
work of thinkers influenced by Darwin and those who reacted against Darwinian 
thought. The situation is now more promising. The threat of global ecological 
catastrophe, largely due to the domination of humanity by the defective notions of 
nature and human nature based on the mechanistic world-view, mobilized theoretical 
scientists to write for a broader audience. They showed that post-Newtonian science is 
now aligned with the humanities and justifies the claim that humans are essentially 
social and creative. In doing this they have acknowledged the indissociable relationship 
between science and metaphysics and revived the previously marginalized tradition of 
process philosophy. This has provided the basis for reviving again the question of what 
are humans through a framework, concordant with the most advanced scientific ideas, 
through which earlier ideas on this can be assessed and integrated.  
Against this background, the best path to take to answer the question What are 
humans? should be clearer. It should be evident that the greatest obstacle to posing this 
question properly and arriving at an answer has been the division between the 
humanities and the sciences and the dogmatic metaphysical assumptions of mainstream 
20 For this view see Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, 1976. 
                                                     
 COSMOS AND HISTORY  272 
Newtonian science. While the sciences appear to have been more successful in 
advancing their claims to having genuine knowledge, the argument of the humanists is 
unanswerable. It is necessary to acknowledge the potential of humanity for a much 
more complex form of rationality than it is possible for the tradition of thought deriving 
from Hobbes just to account for the possibility of science. To appreciate the possibility 
of science it is necessary to comprehend the possibility of conscious deliberation and the 
existence of social forms that can develop people’s potential and then sustain them in 
their conscious deliberations. The best place to begin then is with the most profound 
ideas developed within the humanities. These, I believe, are the early work of Hegel 
and those he influenced. Then it is necessary to consider to what extent these ideas can 
be understood, justified and further developed from a non-Idealist perspective. 
HEGEL ON HUMAN NATURE 
Strongly influenced by Kant and his disciples, Hegel was an Idealist, although an 
Objective or Absolute Idealist rather than a Subjective Idealist. That is, he was not only 
influenced by Kant, Herder and their disciples, but also by Plato, Aristotle and Neo-
Platonism.21 Hegel developed his ideas on human nature most explicitly in the Jena 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit from 1804 to 1806.22 The logic behind these lectures is 
now far better understood through recent work on the history of German philosophy in 
the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. As noted, Kant had argued that 
the condition of the possibility of science, which at the same time then provided the 
basis for upholding the reality of freedom as the foundation for ethics, is the self-
identical “I” which persists through all our changing experiences. This had been 
accepted by Kant’s followers, but J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) had shown that such an “I” 
could only develop and sustain itself as such through limiting itself through recognizing 
and respecting others as free agents who in turn reciprocate this recognition, 
recognizing its own freedom.23 This correction of Kant, involving an appreciation of 
the essential sociality of humans, that people only become humans through their 
relation to others, provided Fichte with the means to reformulate Kant’s ethical 
philosophy in a way that overcame its abstract nature and provided a much stronger 
motivation for acting ethically. Behaving ethically was now conceived as limiting 
oneself to act only on those principles that accorded with full recognition of the 
freedom of others, which was seen as the condition for achieving full self-hood. 
Friedrich Hölderlin, and following him, F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), extended Fichte’s 
21 On the meaning of ‘Idealism’ for Hegel, see Frederick Beiser, Hegel, New York: Routledge, 2005, chap.5. 
On the meaning of idealism more generally, see Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against 
Subjectivism -  1781-1801, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
22 G.W. F. Hegel, System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox, N.Y.: 
S.U.N.Y. Press, 1979, pp.205-253; Leo Rauch, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures of the 
Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6) with commentary, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983). For an analysis of 
these lectures, see Jürgen Habermas ‘Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Mind’, 
in Theory and Practice, London: Heinemann, 1974, pp.:142-169. 
23 J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right [1796-97], Frederick Neuhouser (ed.), trans. Michael Baur, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.29. 
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argument and claimed that even mutual recognition is not enough to achieve self-hood; 
this also presupposes a whole of which subjects and objects are parts, which he termed 
‘being’.24 Hegel synthesized these insights with Herder’s philosophy, embracing 
Herder’s notion of culture and organic view of nature. He then reformulated all this 
through ideas from Plato and Aristotle as these had been taken up and developed in 
Christianity, and spoke of Spirit and its development through history rather than 
culture and the development of humanity. In this way Hegel was able to examine the 
components of culture and provide an explanation for the development of humanity 
through history. 
Accordingly, Hegel rejected Kant's notion of the preformed ego, the “I” 
represented as a pure unity relating to itself, and portrayed the ego as the result of the 
development, from immediate sensitivity to self-awareness, then to self-consciousness 
gained through achieving reciprocity of recognition in interpersonal relationships, and 
finally to universality through participation in ethical and cultural life, which he 
characterized as Spirit. Hegel characterized this formative process as part of three 
interdependent dialectical patterns: symbolic representation which operates through 
the medium of language; the labour process which operates through the medium of the 
tool; and interaction on the basis of reciprocity which operates through the medium of 
moral relations.25 Reciprocity operating through moral relations is clearly an extension 
of Fichte’s philosophy. However, following Herder, Hegel emphasized that these moral 
relations are part of a culture which precedes the individual and mediates their 
relation.26 It is an order of relations, extending from the family through civil society 
(based on recognition of property) and corporations (trade unions) to the State 
(understood as a self-governing community) as a whole and its institutions, including 
the institutions of government. Following Hölderlin’s insight (further developed by 
Schelling) that this is only possible in the context of nature, Hegel recognized the 
importance of labour by which nature is transformed so that we live in a world of 
“tools”, instruments serving human purposes and facilitating the continued 
transformation of nature to satisfy desire.27 This humanized world of tools or 
instruments also precedes the individual, and through socialization into this world of 
tools and through labouring we also transcend our particularity, unite with the 
universal and develop into unitary subjects. Finally, embracing Herder’s notion of 
language and through this, upholding the quest to comprehend the world and our 
place within it, Hegel argued that language is a medium that precedes the individual 
24 Friedrich Hölderlin, ‘To Hegel’, Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. Thomas Pfau, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1988, p.124-6. See also Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European 
Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1993, p.26. 
25 Habermas in “Labour and Interaction” argued that Hegel abandoned his earlier ideas on the three 
dialectical patterns, replacing it with the trichotomy ‘Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit and Absolute 
Spirit’. This claim has been rejected by subsequent interpreters of Hegel. See for example Robert R. 
Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
26 On Hegel’s development of Fichte’s insights, see Robert R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the 
Other, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992. Most of the Jena lectures are devoted to the 
struggle for recognition. 
27 See Hegel, System of Ethical Life, p.228ff. and Hegel and the Human Spirit, p.103ff. 
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and is also a condition for transcending particularity to develop as self-conscious 
subjects.28 Each dialectic is dependent upon the other two, but has its own unique 
dynamic irreducible to the other two. The individual simultaneously participates in all 
three of these dialectics and thereby comes to transcend his or her immediacy and 
particularity and takes the perspective of the universal, thereby gaining self-hood.  
This is only achieved in stages, however, and in the early stages of human history 
was more potential than reality, distorted by the conflict of wills and the subjugation of 
some people to the will of others. It is always a quest, perhaps never finally realized. It 
is through striving to realize this selfhood through participation in Spirit that provides 
the impetus for the development from one shape of Spirit to another through history 
associated with different forms of Objective Spirit or institutional structures. It is the 
quest for recognition that has led to the extension of the recognition of the significance 
of others, first to broader strata of each community, then between communities and 
eventually, to recognition of the freedom and significance of all of humanity, 
crystallized in the institutions of the modern State. This advance in the dialectic of 
recognition has been facilitated by the dialectic of labour that has provided the 
technology to make this possible. Less obviously, this development has also required the 
development of the dialectic of representation (associated with Absolute Spirit and art, 
religion and philosophy) through which people have been able to comprehend nature 
as that which must be understood if it is to be transformed to serve human purposes, 
comprehend the rationality of their institutions and comprehend the history of 
humanity as Spirit realizing its full potential. Through this dialectic another world is 
generated having the form of Spirit itself in which Spirit attains a view of what is Spirit 
itself.29 Through this conception of humanity Hegel attempted to comprehend its 
development through history up to the modern world, providing an ethics and political 
philosophy which he hoped could reconcile individualism and community and reveal 
how to bring the dynamics of the market under control through corporations and the 
institutions of the State. 
SCHELLING’S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL 
Hegel’s faith in the future was based on his Idealism, although Hegel seldom used this 
term to characterize his work. The marginalization of Hegel’s ideas is largely due to the 
supposed supersession of Idealism by a naturalistic evolutionary perspective. However, 
ideas about humans and humanity close to Hegel’s, although less developed, had been 
defended during his lifetime and then shortly after from a non-reductionist evolutionary 
perspective by Friedrich Schelling. While originally Hegel and Schelling had been 
collaborators, their philosophies diverged until eventually Schelling set out to expose 
what he took to be the defects in Hegel’s philosophy. While Schelling, influenced by 
Fichte and Herder, upheld a conception of humans similar to Hegel’s,30 he was far 
28 See Hegel and the Human Spirit, p.89ff.and Hegel, System of Ethical Life, p.218 & 244f. 
29 Hegel and the Human Spirit, p.173. 
30 See F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath, Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1978, Part Four. See also Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, pp.39-45. 
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more appreciative than Hegel of the prior reality of nature.31 He argued against Hegel 
that there is an ‘unprethinkable being’ that precedes all thought and is the condition of 
thought. Nature precedes Spirit; it is not posited by Spirit, as Hegel had claimed.32 But 
nature must be conceived as capable, at its highest level of development, of giving rise 
to the self-conscious subject that could arrive at knowledge of nature.33 According to 
Schelling, the process of self-constitution or self-organization, rather than being a 
marginal phenomenon, must be the primal ground of all reality.34 Generalizing Fichte’s 
notion that the self-conscious subject emerges through being limited, Schelling argued 
that the stages in the development of nature can be understood as a sequence of 
limitings of activity.35 His procedure was to subtract from self-consciousness to arrive at 
the lowest conceivable potential, and then construct the path upward to show how the 
conscious self could be conceived to emerge from this. The lowest potential arrived at 
was the “pure subject-object”, a realm more primordial than either subjects or objects, 
which Schelling equated with nature. He claimed that the “unconscious” stages 
through which consciousness emerges can only become conscious to an “I” which has 
developed out of them and realizes its dependence upon them. Nature was conceived 
as essentially activity or, simultaneously, “productivity” (or process) and “products”. 
Without productivity, there could be no products, and without products, there could be 
no productivity. Whatever product or form exists is in perpetual process of being 
formed by being limited, or forming itself by limiting itself. Initially, productivity 
consists in opposed activities limiting each other, and Schelling proclaimed, “give me a 
nature made up of opposed activities … and from that I will bring forth for you the 
intelligence, with the whole system of its presentations.”36 From opposed activities 
emerge force and matter, space and time, chemicals and non-living and living 
organisms. Dead matter, in which product prevails over productivity, is a result of the 
stable balance of forces where products have achieved a state of indifference. 
Organisms are self-organizing beings in which productivity cannot easily maintain 
products in a state of indifference. Living organisms differ from non-living organisms in 
that their complexity makes it even more difficult to maintain a state of indifference. 
They must respond to changes in their environments creatively to form and reform 
themselves as products. Life is the condition for the emergence of Spirit, with its social 
forms and their history. With Spirit, we have the emergence of self-consciousness and 
the freedom to choose evil or good. Evil is the domination of the blind self-seeking urge. 
31 See Beiser, German Idealism, p.506ff. 
32 For Schelling’s critique of Hegel on this point, see F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The 
Berlin Lectures, trans. Bruce Matthews, New York: State University of New York Press, 2007, p.150ff. 
33 See F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature [1799] trans. Keith R. Peterson, New 
York: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2004. Schelling’s clearest exposition of this was in “The Philosophy of Nature” in On 
the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.114-
133. 
34 On this, see Marie-Luise Heuser-Kessler, Die Produktivität der Natur: Schellings Naturphilosophie und das neue 
Paradigma de Selbsorganization in den Naturwissenshcaften, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1986. 
35 Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, p.17ff.  
36 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath, (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1978), p.72. 
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It is creative power out of control, like cancer; but without such power there would be 
no existence and no good. Good emerges through limiting this power.37  
MARX AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Schelling was a major influence on Marx, both directly and indirectly through 
Schelling’s influence on Feuerbach who influenced Marx.38 Hegel’s conception of 
humans was largely accepted by Marx, although the idea of this being the development 
of Spirit was rejected and replaced first by the idea of Man developing through history 
(in the 1844 Manuscripts), and then by the idea of people in relations developing through 
history (in The German Ideology).39 While Marx emphasized the dialectic of labour rather 
than the other two dialectics, it is clear from his work that unlike many of his followers 
he fully appreciated the importance of the other two dialectics. Marx’s denunciation of 
Jeremy Bentham as “that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the ordinary 
bourgeois intelligence” who took “the modern shopkeeper, especially the English 
shopkeeper, as the normal man”, contrasted with how Bentham should have 
proceeded, dealing with “human nature in general, and then with human nature as 
modified in each historical epoch”40 reveals his contempt for utilitarianism and, beyond 
that, the whole tradition of thought deriving from Hobbes.41 It also reveals how he 
believed social critiques should be conducted since it indicates that he believed that all 
his work presupposed such a general conception of human nature. The notion that 
people could be alienated by social relations from their own creative powers assumes an 
appreciation of the dialectic of recognition, and that Marx devoted so much work to 
exposing the illusions created by economists to disguise this alienation reveals the 
importance he accorded to the dialectic of representation. That is, Marx’s later work 
concurs with his early work in which philosophical anthropology is explicit and 
explicitly evaluative, as in “Comments on James Mill” where Marx characterized  
“human society” as a society in which all human powers are released so that “I would 
have directly confirmed and realized my true nature, my human nature, my communal 
nature. Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential 
nature.”42  
37 Schelling develops his ideas about freedom in Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann, La Salle, Ill.: 
Open Court, 1954. 
38 See James D. White, “Marx: From ‘The Critique of Political Economy’ to ‘Capital’”, Studies in Marxism, 
1, 1994: 89-105. 
39 The difference between Hegel and Marx appears far less when Hegel’s early lectures are taken into 
account, lectures of which Marx was unaware when he criticized Hegel in his “Critique of the Hegelian 
Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole” in the 1844 Manuscripts. 
40 Karl Marx, Capital Vol.1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling [1887], Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1974, p.570 and 571, n.2. 
41 That Marx was hostile to “moralism” does not mean that he was hostile to ethics or that he embraced a 
Hobbesian view of humans. On this see Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, 2nd ed. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. 
42 Karl Marx, ‘’Comments on James Mill Elements Economie Politique,” Karl Marx Friedrich Engels: collected Works 
Volume.3, March 1843-August 1844, New York: International Publishers, p.228.  
                                                     
 ARRAN GARE  277 
The emphasis on labour was not the basis of his originality, however. What was 
more important was that following Schelling and Feuerbach he rejected Hegel’s 
Idealism and along with this, the idea that nature is posited by Spirit, and recognized 
there is more to history than the unfolding of the three dialectics. To begin with, he 
gave a much more central place to struggles between different classes in the progress of 
humanity. This, however, only slightly modified Hegel’s conception of humans. What is 
far more significant is the place he accorded to nature. As Marx pointed out, the labour 
process is “the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and 
Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and 
therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to 
every such phase.”43 As such the productive process is the metabolism of society, and as 
with the study of organisms, everything else must be understood in relation to it. 
Secondly, Marx came to appreciate that the major problem for understanding 
humanity is to comprehend how a rift could have occurred in this metabolic 
relationship. As Marx wrote: 
It is not the unity of living and active humanity with the natural, inorganic 
conditions of their metabolic exchange with nature, and hence their appropriation 
of nature, which requires explanation or is the result of historic process, but rather 
the separation between these inorganic conditions of human existence and this 
active existence, a separation which is completely posited only in the relation of 
wage labour and capital.44 
His critique of political economy was designed to reveal how the market had emerged 
from the communities which had created it to take on a life of its own, how it had come 
to dominate people, reproducing exploitative relations of production and extending 
itself both extensively, until it had encompassed the globe, and intensively, 
commodifying more and more aspects of reality. He showed that crucial to this is the 
process of extending categories of economics from exchange of products mediated by 
money to exchange of land and labour power. These categories serve as forms of 
existence which simultaneously define the relationship between people and humans 
and nature, prescribe how to act while blinding people to the true nature of their 
relationships to each other and to nature. It results in ‘the reduction of agricultural 
population to a constantly falling minimum, and confronts it with a constantly growing 
industrial population crowded together in large cities ... [creating] conditions which 
cause an irreparable break in the coherence of social interchange prescribed by the 
natural laws of life... [squandering] the vitality of the soil.’45 As a consequence people, 
whether employees or employers (proletarians or bourgeois), have been compelled to 
behave in a way that reproduces and expands the economy, continually revolutionizing 
the means of production, while rendering people increasingly dependent and 
43 Karl Marx Capital Vol.I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling [1887], Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
1974, p.179. 
44 Karl Marx Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p.489. 
45 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.III, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p.813. On this aspect of Marx, see Brett 
Clark and Richard York, “Carbon metabolism: Global capitalism, climate change, and the biospheric rift”  
Theory and Society, 2005, Vol.34: 391-428. 
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increasingly vulnerable to others in the economy and to the laws of its development 
which are destroying the natural conditions of their existence. Marx recognized this 
condition to be a form of slavery, as the Romans had understood this term. At the same 
time, this study revealed that there was nothing natural in this order, that it was 
inherently unstable and that it is possible that the worst affected members of this system 
could transform these social relations, appropriate the developed means of production 
and create a more human, less destructive society. 
Through this study Marx came to appreciate that there could be no necessary 
unfolding of humanity’s potential through history. The dynamics of the market 
confront people as a second nature, and the tendencies described by its laws of 
development could just as well lead to the destruction of humanity as to the realization 
of people’s highest potentialities. It was merely a contingent fact that the tendencies in 
capitalism at the time in which Marx was writing might have been producing the 
conditions that could have facilitated the creation of a new form of society in which 
people would overcome their alienation and enslavement to the market. The future is 
open, and it is possible that the dynamics of the market will lead to the destruction of 
the natural conditions for humanity’s very existence. Having revealed this, Marx 
became more and more concerned about the way in which human products could turn 
against their producers. The very nature of the technology humans were developing 
under imperatives to maximize profitability could make it impossible for them to regain 
control of the market.46  
If there is one emergent process or formation within culture, there is no reason why 
there cannot be others. This is one of Georg Simmel's central insights, clearly inspired 
by Marx’s work: 
Whenever life progresses beyond the animal level of culture, an internal 
contradiction appears... We speak of culture whenever life produces certain forms 
in which it expresses and realizes itself... But although these forms arise out of the 
life process, because of their unique constellation they do not share the restless 
rhythm of life, its ascent and descent, its constant renewal, its incessant divisions 
and reunifications... They acquire fixed identities, a logic and lawfulness of their 
own; this new rigidity inevitably places them at a distance from the spiritual 
dynamic which created them and which makes them independent... This 
characteristic of cultural processes was first noted in economic change.47 
Simmel's work involved identifying and analysing the nature, generation and 
reproduction of these forms. Robert Michels' analysis of the iron law of oligarchy in 
political parties, Lewis Mumford's analysis of the emergence and dynamics of cities, 
William McNeill's analysis of the emergence of “microparasitism” and 
“macroparasitism”, Michel Foucault's identification of emergent discursive formations: 
the asylum, the clinic, the prison and so on, Bourdieu's analysis of the dynamics of 
46 On the evolution of Marx’s thought, showing how different Marx’s ideas were from those of the 
Marxists, see James D. White, Karl Marx and the Intellectual Origins of Dialectical Materialism, Houndmills: 
Macmillan, 1996. 
47 Georg Simmel, 'The Conflict in Modern Culture', in Donald N. Levine ed. George Simmel on Individual and 
Social Forms, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp.375-393, p.375f. 
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economic, political and cultural fields, the work of various Marxists who have identified 
and revealed emergent tendencies in both non-capitalist and late capitalist socio-
economic formations, the work of Wallerstein and his colleagues in describing the 
concentration of economic and political power and the differentiation of the world-
system of capitalism into cores, semi-peripheries and peripheries, and the accounts of 
Kent Flannery and Roy Rappaport on the tendency of dominant social systems to 
“hypercoherence” - to increase control, to use up more and more available energy, 
until a stage is reached where they have so much power that they can survive while 
contributing little or nothing to the systems on which they are dependent - until they 
destroy these systems, the conditions of their own existence,48 can all be interpreted as 
studies of emergent social forms or processes in accordance with Marx’s revised 
conception of the nature of humans.  
It is as a consequence of the emergence of such a system at a global level, 
dominated by a new transnational class of predator managers, that we now have the 
destructive exploitation of the world economy described by Stephen Bunker in which: 
The flow of energy from extractive to productive economies reduces the 
complexity and power of the first and increases complexity and power in the 
second. The actions and characteristics of modern states and their complex and 
costly bureaucracies accelerate these sequences..... Extractive appropriation 
impoverishes the environment on which local populations depend both for their 
own reproduction and for the extraction of commodities for export…. Once the 
profit-maximizing logic of extraction for trade across regional ecosystems is 
introduced ...  price differentials between extractive commodities and the 
differential return to extractive labour stimulate concentrated exploitation of a 
limited number of resources at rates which disrupt both the regeneration of these 
resources and the biotic chains of co-evolved species and associated geological and 
hydrological regimes… The exchange relations which bind this system together 
depend on locally dominant groups to reorganize local modes of production and 
extraction in response to world demand, but the ultimate collapse will be global, 
not local. The continued impoverishment of peripheral regions finally damages 
the entire system.49 
POST-REDUCTIONIST SCIENCE: HIERARCHY THEORY, BIOSEMIOTICS 
AND HUMAN CULTURE 
It is in this context that the dialectic of representation has to be recognized as of 
increasing importance. It is only by virtue of people’s capacity to develop more 
adequate understanding of nature and the place of humanity within nature, of what are 
human potentialities, both for greatness and destruction, that humans will be able to 
realize their potential to avert the destruction of the global ecosystem and create a 
better world. Extension of the study of the dynamics of the market and how it has 
48 Kent V. Flannery, 'The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations', Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol.3, 
1972, pp.399-426 developing the work of Rappaport.  
49 Stephen G. Bunker in Underdeveloping the Amazon, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.21f., 47 & 
253. 
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dominated humanity has revealed the role of reductionist materialism in gaining the 
knowledge to control natural processes and people. It has been supported because it 
provides the kind of knowledge that is valuable as a commodity and can be sold as 
such, but also because it legitimates the Hobbesian view of humans and thereby the 
dominance of the market as the best possible way of organizing human relations, 
blinding people to their own potential for liberation from the laws of the market. This is 
the only way to explain the domination of modernity by a conception of the world 
which, by denying the possibility of emergence and thereby the reality of life and 
humanity as anything more than efficient machines, is manifestly incoherent. The 
irrationality of the adherence to this incoherence is becoming more obvious as 
advances in science are forcing scientists to acknowledge the reality of emergence. 
Accepting this reality involves very fundamental rethinking of virtually every aspect of 
science since allowing for it and comprehending its possibility changes the very 
meaning of scientific explanation and comprehension. Among other things, this 
requires an appreciation of the limits of mathematics and a fundamental rethinking of 
the role of mathematics in science. It involves appreciating that explanation cannot be 
merely a matter of accounting for phenomena by showing them to be manifestations of 
something else, since in some cases the very existence of that which is to be explained 
can only be accounted for in terms of the immanent dynamics of that which has 
emerged. This essentially is the problem Marx was struggling with in his study of the 
emergence and self-reproducing dynamics of the autonomous market. But, while 
recognizing emergence involves accepting the irreducibility of that which has emerged 
to the conditions of its emergence, it is still necessary to account for the possibility of 
such emergence.  
Schelling’s idea that emergence occurs through limiting or constraining of activity 
was rediscovered with the development of hierarchy theory, particularly as it was 
developed by Howard Pattee and those he influenced. For these hierarchy theorists, the 
very being of any system involves self-constraining, and having abandoned determinism 
and accepted that the future to some extent is open, they appreciated that such self-
constraining is the basis of the freedom of these systems. Constraining is creative and 
facilitative. As Pattee wrote: 
The constraints of the genetic code on ordinary chemistry make possible the 
diversity of living forms. At the next level, the additional constraints of genetic 
suppressors make possible the integrated development of functional organs and 
multi-cellular individuals. At the highest levels of control we know that legal 
constraints are necessary to establish a free society, and constraints of spelling and 
syntax are prerequisites for free expression of thought.50  
In developing hierarchy theory, Pattee was particularly concerned to provide a physical 
account of control, which, he argued, required of systems that they generate models of 
themselves to effect such control. That is, he attempted to account for how physical 
50 H. Pattee, Hierarchy Theory: The Challenge of Complex Systems, New York George Braziller, 1973, p.73f. 
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processes could generate symbols or signs.51 Through producing and interpreting signs, 
systems can respond not only to their immediate situation but can anticipate what 
situations they will encounter in the future.  
It was soon realized by Stanley Salthe that Pattee’s ideas accorded with and 
supported the more radical work of the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce who, 
characterizing himself as a “Schellingian of some stripe”, had attempted to develop a 
general theory of signs, to account for their possibility and to suggest that the 
production and interpretation of signs pervades nature.52 The most general definition of 
a sign offered by Peirce was that it is that which “mediates between an object and an 
interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and 
determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the 
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of the ‘sign’.”53 It is 
important to emphasize here “this tri-relative influence” is not “in any way resolvable 
into actions between pairs”;54 that is, this influence cannot be analysed into cause-effect 
relations, and involves some measure of creativity in nature. Interpretants can 
themselves become signs, generating new interpretants, and this process can continue 
indefinitely. Such semiosis involves limiting or constraining of possibilities of the 
interpretant by the object through the sign, but this is what facilitates some control by a 
system of its own future.  
Pattee’s and Salthe’s work has provided strong support for the extension of 
semiotics to the biological world by the biosemioticians such as Jesper Hoffmeyer and 
Kalevi Kull, where it has been shown to be central not only to thought but to action 
and to the growth of organisms.55 In fact, the production and interpretation of signs or 
semiosis in self-conscious thought presupposes semiosis in actions, or “animal” semiosis, 
which in turn presupposes semiosis in growth, or “vegetative” semiosis, which in turn 
presupposes semiosis at the level of the cell. Each stage in this developmental sequence 
involves new levels of constraint. Semiosis can and frequently does involve all four 
levels: cellular, vegetative, animal and symbolic. For example the growth of flowers and 
their opening is a sign to bees, which is interpreted in their activities of collecting 
nectar, but also in bee dances in their hives by which they indicate to other bees where 
flowers (if there is a shortage of flowers) can be found. Semiosis is central to all life. 
Hoffmeyer argues that the emergence of the global ecosystem has created what he calls 
the “semiosphere”, a global system of sign production and interpretation largely 
constituting the life of the global ecosystem.56 
From the perspective of post-reductionist evolutionary theory, evolution has to be 
understood as a creative process by which ecosystems experiment with new forms of 
51 See H.H. Pattee, ‘The Necessity of Biosemiotics: Matter-Symbol Complementarity’, Introduction to 
Biosemiotics: The New Biological Synthesis, Marcello Barbieri (ed.), Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, chap. 4. 
52 S.N. Salthe, Development and Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology, New York: Braziller, 1973, p.13ff. 
53  C. S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893-1913), T. P. E. Project (ed.), 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p.410. 
54 C. S. Peirce, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, J. Buchler (ed.), New York Dover 1955, p.282. 
55 See K. Kull, 'An Introduction to phytosemiotics: Semiotic botany and vegetative sign systems', Sign, 
System, Studies, No.28, 2000, pp.326-350. 
56  Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1996. 
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life, which, if they contribute to the resilience of these ecosystems, tend to survive.57 In 
this, the development of new forms of symbiosis, usually involving new kinds of 
semiosis, is much more important than the competitive struggle for survival. Excessive 
competition actually cripples such experimentation and thereby evolutionary 
development.58 
THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN CULTURE AS A COMPONENT OF THE 
SEMIOSPHERE 
It is in this context, that is, in a global ecosystem, characterized by enormously complex 
forms of interaction involving complex forms of semiosis, that humans and human 
culture emerged.59 Human culture is associated with a unique kind of semiosis 
generated by unique kinds of constraint. As Ernst Cassirer noted on the basis of studies 
of animals such as chimpanzees which have much in common with humans yet differ 
fundamentally from them, and from brain damaged patients who had lost some of 
humanity’s unique characteristics:  
The function circle of man is not only quantitatively enlarged; it has also 
undergone a qualitatively change. Between the receptor system and the effector 
system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link, 
which we may describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the 
whole of human life. As compared with the other animals man lives not merely in 
a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.60  
What is the basis of this new dimension? It is characterized by a dissociation of 
semiosis from growth and activity and the capacity to reflect on the semiosis associated 
with these, and the capacity to then constrain activity in accordance with this 
dissociated, reflexive semiosis. It is a “second-order” semiosis. What is distinctive about 
this is illustrated by brain damaged patients with language deficiencies. It was shown 
that these were not isolated defects but manifestations of global changes in the patient’s 
whole mode of being in the world.61 Patients would forget words that named things, but 
would still be able to characterize things by describing their function, for instance, 
“apple parer” for “knife”. What was surprising was that at the same time they would 
lose the ability to knock on an imaginary door. The crucial loss appears to be the loss of 
imagination. It is imagination that is central to and is opened up by this the new 
dimension.62 It is imagination that is required to transcend one’s immediate 
57 See Robert G.G. Reid, Biological Emergence: Evolution by Natural Experiment, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2007. 
58 See Peter A. Corning, Holistic Darwinism: Synergy, Cybernetics, and the Bioeconomics of Evolution, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
59 On the emergence of culture as a specific kind of semiosis, see Wendy Wheeler, The Whole Creature: 
Complexity, Biosemiotics and the Evolution of Culture, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2006. 
60 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970, p.26. 
61 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Volume 3: The Phenomenology of Knowledge, trans. Ralph 
Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, p.220ff. 
62 The significance of imagination in all distinctively human capacities has been strongly argued by 
Cornelius Castoriadis. See his ‘Logic, Imagination, Reflection’ in World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, 
                                                     
 ARRAN GARE  283 
involvement in the world, to see the world from the perspective of others, and then to 
define oneself as a person playing a particular role from the perspective of these others. 
Imagination is required to recognize functions independently of their particular 
applications, to recognize tools (including buildings and means of transport as well as 
tools in the narrow sense) as signs of this function rather than mere handy instruments, 
and then to make tools and invent new tools to serve these functions.63 And imagination 
is central to the use of all but the most basic, context bound, uses of language. It is the 
basis of not only of art and literature but also philosophy, mathematics and science. In 
particular, as Paul Ricoeur has argued, it is central to the construction and reception of 
stories or narratives.64  
All emergent order involves new constraints, and this is also true of semiosis in 
general and semiosis associated with the dialectics of culture. Defining oneself through 
proper recognition of others involves constraining of thought and action in taking into 
account the freedom and significance of others.65 It is this dialectic of recognition that is 
most important for creating complex institutions and forms of organization with stable 
role relationships that can be sustained over generations. The dialectic of recognition, 
while partially autonomous, is dependent upon and greatly augmented by the dialectic 
of representation, particularly cosmology and stories or narratives. Stories also greatly 
augment the dialectic of labour by allowing people to develop complex forms of 
cooperation for projects over long durations, extending beyond the lives of individuals. 
All complex actions involving many people are lived stories and require the telling and 
retelling the story of the action in which people are engaged, and then constraining 
action in accordance with the logic of these stories. Stories are also central to the 
development of communities and institutions, and to maintaining their vitality. It is 
only through telling and retelling the history of communities and institutions that the 
point of their existence can be understood and revised, including institutions of 
mathematical and scientific research. And stories are central to individuals in their 
efforts to orient themselves in a socially constituted and socially produced world, to live 
life authentically and to refigure the stories they have inherited and within which they 
are situated.66 The development of history as the story of the past in the service of 
orienting people to create the future has engendered a drive for justice as the proper 
recognition of both oneself and others. Cosmology enables these stories to situate 
humanity and its history in relation to the rest of nature. 
Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, trans. and ed. David Ames Curtis, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997, pp. 246-272. 
63 For a semiotic analysis of the capacity to use and make tools and appreciate them as such, see Umberto 
Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, p.22. 
64 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol.1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
65 On this, see Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996. This dialectic 
has been interpreted semiotically by George Herbert Mead in Mind, Self, & Society, Charles W. Morris (ed.), 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
66 On stories or narratives, see Arran Gare, ‘The Primordial Role of Stories in Human Self-Creation’, 
Cosmos & History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol.3(1), 2007, pp.93-114. 
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While this dialectic of recognition might have begun with the quest to do justice to 
a small number of individuals, the “heroes” of society, once the process of people 
orienting themselves through histories, real and “fictitious”, story-telling carried with it 
a tendency to extend such recognition. To begin with, this was associated with 
extending recognition to other members of a community, then to the community’s 
institutions through which recognition of each individual is crystallized, then to other 
communities. Recognition of institutions involves recognizing that taking up a role in 
such institutions puts one under an obligation to live up the requirements of this role, 
remembering the achievements of those who occupied such roles in the past, 
acknowledging the significance of those to whom one is related through these roles and 
institutions, and appreciating and possibly augmenting the ideals constituting them. 
This does not mean that all recognition has been affirmation. Recognizing others might 
be recognizing them as enemies and threats to one’s freedom. It can lead to conflict, 
violence and destruction of the other or their enslavement in which people are 
constrained to function as instruments of the other’s will. It can involve the emergence 
of class societies in which constraints of oppressive institutions stultify people’s potential. 
There is also the possibility of social forms emerging in association with such 
domination that constrain their members to reproduce and expand these forms so that 
they take on a life of their own, oppressing even their privileged members. However, 
the dialectic of recognition, augmented by narratives, opens the possibility for people to 
identify and struggle against enslavement to such forms, and to create new forms based 
on recognition of people’s real potentiality. Such recognition could be extended to the 
whole of humanity and then to the rest of nature. Especially with the development of 
writing, history carries within it an impetus to develop into a grand narrative 
encompassing all human communities, including all civilizations, emancipating people 
from oppressive social forms and projecting a future social order in which all beings will 
be properly recognized. This will be an order in which people will fulfil themselves in 
their work by augmenting life rather than being enslaved to the ecologically destructive 
dynamics of the global market. Most importantly, imagination makes it possible for 
people as individuals and as communities to appreciate their place in nature and in 
human history, to appreciate the intrinsic value and the suffering and potentialities of 
others, and the historical significance of their own lives.   
CONCLUSION 
What then are humans, what are their possibilities and what ought humans be? The 
dominant view, the view of mainstream science and economics, is still that humans are 
complex machines, the product of the long history of the struggle for survival in which 
the fittest have survived. The natural extension of the order of nature is the free market 
within which the fittest will prevail and drive economic progress and individuals will 
express the only freedom they are capable of by choosing what to buy and sell. Since 
people are necessarily egoists, however much they might try to disguise this, there is no 
possibility of redirecting humanity along a different path from where it is now heading. 
If this path leads to the destruction of the vast majority of humans and most other 
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forms of life on Earth, this is an unavoidable unfolding of history according to the laws 
of nature which will filter out the less fit. Even if the result is the total destruction of 
humanity, this should not be seen as a matter of great concern. As an economist writing 
in Business and Society Review put it: “Suppose that, as a result of using up all the world's 
resources, human life did come to an end. So what?”67  
From the perspective of post-mechanist science offered here, this view is no longer 
defensible. Humans should now be seen as experiments of the global ecosystem 
characterized by a unique type of semiosis. This makes them essentially cultural beings 
as Herder, Hegel, Schelling and Marx argued, with enormous potential for creativity, 
and destruction. Because of the constraints associated with the development of culture 
they have far more potential both to live for the higher ends of justice, power or liberty, 
and truth (associated with the dialectics of recognition, labour and representation) than 
Hobbes could allow, but also far more potential to oppress and destroy. Their creative 
powers make it possible for them to control their own destinies in a way that is 
impossible for any other life-form. However, the unique semiosis which makes this 
possible also makes it possible for them to enslave each other and to produce social 
forms which, taking on a life of their own, enslave everyone to their dynamics and 
delude people about what they are doing. Such dynamics can break through the 
constraints which would otherwise govern people’s relation to each other and to the 
rest of nature. But then humans have the potential to criticize and rebel against 
oppressive social forms and create new social forms. It is their unique potential for such 
creativity, destruction and rebellion against tyranny that has resulted in their playing a 
major role in the dynamics of the global ecosystem.  
At present people are being driven by a global market and the predator managers 
who dominate corporations and most government institutions to live in a way that is 
destroying so much of terrestrial life and producing so much pollution, most 
importantly, greenhouse gases, that they threaten the conditions of their own existence. 
But this global market can only function on the basis of human culture, and it is this 
culture that also makes it possible to understand these dynamics, rebel and overcome 
them, creating new social forms that could liberate humanity’s higher potentialities. To 
fulfil their role in history and in the cosmos, people need to embrace the immanent 
tendencies of the three dialectical patterns towards truth, justice and liberty and 
constrain the way people live accordingly. The quest for truth is above all the drive to 
expose falsehoods and illusions and to gain a coherent conception of the world and the 
place of humanity within it, and advances in the quest for truth are overcoming the 
mechanistic world-view and replacing it with a conception of the world as a creative 
process within which we are creative participants. This is invalidating the Hobbesian 
notion of humans and the technocratic orientation to the world that has blinded people 
to the autonomous dynamics of nature and the potentialities of humans. The post-
mechanistic world-view allows us to see the significance of justice as proper recognition 
of others and oneself in thought and action, and to appreciate our potential role in 
extending justice, democratizing social relations and augmenting rather than 
67 Cited by Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, New York: W.W. Norton, 1975, p.170. 
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undermining the global ecosystem. It allows us to see that power is liberty, that is, 
having the necessities of life and the conditions for realizing one’s highest potential 
guaranteed, being able to participate in deliberations about and working towards the 
common good of one’s communities, both social and ecological, and being able to fulfil 
oneself in one’s work, without constant fear of harm by others. Liberty is not achieved 
through reducing everyone and everything to instruments in the service of satisfying 
appetites, or, as Hobbes put it, having the entire world fearing and obeying one. Power 
as liberty is the freedom to live and work with integrity, being just to others and being 
treated justly in return. It is having the conditions necessary to become human by 
participating in augmenting life. 
Reinvigorating these dialectical patterns and the drive towards their immanent 
ends requires liberation and reinvigoration of what underlies the distinctive semiosis of 
humans: imagination. This does not mean Hobbes’ imagination, conceived as 
“decaying sense”,68 but creative imagination.69 Imagination is required to appreciate 
the struggles and creative achievements of the past and the traditions and institutions 
we have inherited as a consequence, the significance and situations of others, both 
human and non-human, and what the world could be in the future. It is also required 
to understand the significance of our own lives and actions in the context of a dynamic 
world of living beings, structures and institutions of which we are participants, and our 
responsibility for the future. It is required to enable us to work out how to participate in 
augmenting the life of our human communities and our broader ecological 
communities. It is required to envisage a better world and to be inspired by this vision 
to work towards it.70 Most importantly, it is necessary to overcome the learned stupidity 
of specialists71 and to strive, both as individuals and as communities, for a 
comprehensive understanding of the cosmos and human history and our place within 
the world. If we do develop our full potential in this regard, humanity will almost 
certainly survive in a global eco-system, augmented in part by our creative efforts. If we 
fail, it is likely that the global eco-system will destroy the conditions of our continued 
existence and eradicate humanity. So, as Ernst Bloch began his book The Spirit of Utopia:  
I am. We are. 
 That is enough. Now we have to begin.72 
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68 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.88. 
69 On the creative imagination, see Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Imaginary: Creation in the Socio-
Historical Domain’ and ‘The Discovery of the Imagination’, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, 
Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, ed. and trans. David Ames Curtis, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
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70 On this, see Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Volume One, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul 
Knight, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995, esp. chap.17. 
71 This is a core message of Murray Code’s book, Process, Reality, and the Power of Symbols, Houndmills: 
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